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WHERE THERE'S SMOKE, IS THERE FIRE?
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE TORT
"CRISIS" IN ILLINOIS
It is well and good to opine or theorize about a subject, as human-
kind is wont to do, but when moral posturing is replaced by an hon-
est assessment of the data, the result is often a new, surprising
insight.'
INTRODUCTION
The Illinois tort system is in a state of crisis-that is what everyone
says, anyway. In the past, such alarmist cries would have provoked
our elders to ask us whether, if everyone else jumped off a cliff, we
would follow. Where along the way did we become so susceptible to
rhetoric and so enthralled with "conventional wisdom"?
The phrase "conventional wisdom" was coined by economist John
Kenneth Galbraith to describe the prevailing attitudes or ideas that
inform our perceptions of society and politics, as well as the authorita-
tive weight attributed to those perceptions. 2 Galbraith's conclusion
was that we tend to "associate truth with convenience," 3 and will often
assimilate only information that "most closely accords with [our] self-
interest and personal well-being or promises best to avoid awkward
effort."'4 With regard to social behavior, Galbraith found that accu-
rately assimilating new ideas and information is too "complex, and to
comprehend their character is mentally tiring."' 5 As a result, "we ad-
here, as though to a raft, to those ideas which represent our [previous]
understanding."'6 In short, conventional wisdom is often incorrect and
relies almost exclusively on the opinions of others. But it persists be-
cause it fits our established value systems, and because people desire
consistency among their beliefs.
This Comment does not examine the origins of conventional wis-
dom or its roots in the theory of cognitive dissonance. Rather, this
Comment examines the conventional wisdom prevailing today, espe-
1. STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, FREAKONOMICS: A ROGUE ECONOMIST Ex-
PLORES THE HIDDEN SIDE OF EVERYTHING 13 (2005).
2. See JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIEmT 6-17 (rev. ed. 1998).
3. Id. at 7.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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cially in political and legal circles, that the tort system in Illinois is in
crisis and in need of serious reform. 7 This Comment objectively ana-
lyzes the underlying data concerning tort claims, jury verdicts, and
awards to determine if the situation is really as bleak as some experts
would have us believe, or if .-we 'are simply indulging an internalized
belief. This Comment will not limit its reach to specific types of
claims, such as medical malpractice, as some papers in this area of law
have done.8 Rather, this Comment focuses on the Illinois tort system
as a whole and, more specifically, the two counties that seem to be at
the center of the tort reform debate: Madison County and St. Clair
County. 9 In fact, these counties were labeled the American Tort Re-
form Association's (ATRA) top two "Judicial Hellholes" in 2004,10
with Madison County taking the top spot in 2003 as well.
This Comment made no predictions as to what the data or analysis
would reveal about the actual condition of the tort system in the heart
of Illinois. The data indicate, however, that reports of our system's
demise have been greatly exaggerated. This sample suggests the fol-
lowing: (1) jurisdictions are not as filled with "junk" suits as some
assert;1 (2) plaintiffs are no more likely to succeed in these counties
than plaintiffs nationally; 12 and (3) punitive and noneconomic dam-
ages in these jurisdictions are neither as prevalent nor as sizeable as
some believe.' 3 It also suggests, however, that there is some validity
to the claim that jury awards are inconsistent, prompting some to
bring suits in the hope of a settlement or of hitting the verdict
jackpot. 14
7. See infra note 9 and accompanying text.
8. For a thoroughly researched piece on the state of medical malpractice litigation in Illinois,
see NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE TORT SYSTEM IN ILLINOIS: A REPORT TO
THE ILLINOIS STATE BAR ASSOCIATION (2005), available at http://eprints.law.duke.edu/archive/
00001125/01/MedicalMalpractice and the.TortSystem inIllinois.pdf [hereinafter VIDMAR,
TORT SYSTEM REPORT].
9. President Bush gave a speech earlier this year from Collinsville, Illinois in Madison County,
citing it as an example of a county in need of tort reform because "lawyers are filing baseless
suits." Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec'y, President Discusses Medical Lia-
bility Reform (Jan. 5, 2005), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/01/20050105-4.html.
10. See AM. TORT REFORM Ass'N, JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2004, at 7 (2004), available at http://
www.atra.org/reports/hellholes/2004/hellholes2004.pdf [hereinafter ATRA, JUDICIAL HELL-
HOLES 2004]. The ATRA describes "Judicial Hellholes" as "places where judges systematically
apply laws and court procedures in an unfair and unbalanced manner, generally against defend-
ants." Id. at 4. The stated purpose of the report, according to ATRA, is to place "[t]he focus...
squarely on the conduct of judges who do not apply the law evenhandedly to all litigants and do
not conduct trials in a fair and balanced manner." Id. at 5.
11. See infra notes 75-83 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 84-104, 150-165 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 105-121 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 122-149 and accompanying text.
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Part II of this Comment provides a background of the tort system
generally and examines each side of the debate concerning our tort
system's crisis. 15 Part III analyzes the data and the inferences, if any,
that can reasonably be drawn from them.16 Part IV discusses the im-
pact of the study and suggests some changes to the Illinois tort sys-
tem.17 Finally, Part V offers some preliminary conclusions based on
the data, as well as some suggestions for future research, discussion,
and procedure.' 8
II. BACKGROUND
This Part discusses the structure and purposes of our modern tort
system, as well as common forms of damages.' 9 It next explains the
methodology used to compile, analyze, and test the data that form the
subject of this Comment.20 This Part also examines national polling
on the issue, providing both a context for what is currently being said
and a partial explanation for why some messages seem to be reso-
nating more effectively with the public than others.21 This Part con-
cludes with some of the salient comments from analysts on both sides
of the issue regarding the alleged crisis in Madison County and St.
Clair County.22
A. The Structure of the Tort System
Any analysis of a structure must begin with a look at its foundation.
Most scholars will agree that the tort system has two primary goals:
"(1) to compensate persons who are injured through the negligence of
others and (2) to deter future negligent behavior," both in the specific
defendant and in others.23 This Comment is primarily concerned with
the compensatory goal of the tort system, within which the law gener-
ally recognizes two subdivisions. The first, labeled "economic" dam-
ages, can be loosely described as any loss that comes with a "price
tag" or is easily calculable. 24 Losses considered "economic" include
15. See infra notes 19-73 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 74-165 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 166-231 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 232-235 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 23-33 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 46-73 and accompanying text.
23. VIDMAR, TORT SYSTEM REPORT, supra note 8, at 8 (emphasis added). For a concrete
application of this maxim in practice, see Kalavity v. United States, 584 F.2d 809, 810-811 (6th
Cir. 1978) (noting that a parachutist drowned on account of the negligence of an air traffic con-
troller and contemplating the different purposes of tort damages).
24. VIDMAR, TORT SYSTEM REPORT, supra note 8, at 8-9.
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past lost wages due to injury and medical bills, as well as future lost
wages and medical expenses. 25 These damages are generally easier to
calculate, but that is not to say that they are not litigated conten-
tiously. 26 This is especially true for future damages, because estimat-
ing them is more speculative than calculating a damage award from
medical bills or time already lost from a job.
The complimentary piece of the compensatory scheme is collec-
tively labeled "noneconomic" damages. These damages are more dif-
ficult to quantify, because there is no underlying bill, record, or pay
stub on which to base them. Noneconomic losses include "pain and
suffering. ' 27 Though pain and suffering damages are the most dis-
cussed type of noneconomic awards,28 other lesser-known damage
categories include "disfigurement, loss of companionship or loss of
consortium; loss of moral guidance; loss of sexual gratification, and
survival pain."' 29 As Professor Neil Vidmar points out, however, the
line between economic and noneconomic damages is often blurred,
because so many noneconomic injuries can have dramatic economic
repercussions. 30 Although mindful of this problem, this Comment dis-
tinguishes between economic and noneconomic damages because it is
the latter that has raised the ire of politicians and advocacy groups.31
Where possible, this Comment specifies what portions of the awards
are noneconomic when reporting the jury awards and analyzing their
effect.32
25. Id.; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 552 (8th ed. 2004).
26. VIDMAR, TORT SYSTEM REPORT, supra note 8, at 9.
27. For an interesting discussion on both sides of the issue of pain and suffering damage
awards, see Kevin J. Gfell, Note, The Constitutional and Economic Implications of a National
Cap on Non-economic Damages in Medical Malpractice Actions, 37 IND. L. REV. 773, 778-81
(2004).
28. See infra notes 180-182.
29. VIDMAR, TORT SYSTEM REPORT, supra note 8, at 9; accord Neil Vidmar et al., Jury Awards
for Medical Malpractice and Post-verdict Adjustments of Those Awards, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 265,
274 (1998).
30. VIDMAR, TORT SYsTEM REPORT, supra note 8, at 9. Vidmar eloquently illustrates this
point:
In practical fact many of the legally-recognized categories of "non-economic" dam-
ages have economic consequences. For example, if someone's face is horribly disfig-
ured it will probably cause social stigma and personal pain, but the injury may well
have economic implications such as the person's ability to obtain a well-paying job ....
Id.
31. See Press Release, supra note 9; see also ATRA, JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2004, supra note
10; Press Release, John Snow, Sec'y of Treasury, Remarks to the American Tort Reform Associ-
ation's Annual Membership Meeting (Mar. 16, 2004), http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/js1237.
htm.
32. When jury decisions and awards are reported in the Southwestern Illinois Jury Verdict
Reporter, the awards are listed as a total and, if there is a breakdown beyond that (for specific
injuries, or for noneconomic or punitive damages), those pieces are listed parenthetically after
1350 [Vol. 56:1347
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In our current tort system, the difficult and controversial task of
determining the level of awards-or whether to give an award at all-
is left in the hands of the jury, which acts as the arbiter of society's
collective conscience.33 While respecting the crucial role that juries
play in our system of jurisprudence, this Comment analyzes their deci-
sions in the aggregate to see whether there is any substance to the
charge that juries are not performing their duties adequately.
B. Methodology
It would be helpful, before wading into the numbers, to explain the
methods used to compile, analyze, and test the data. It has been said
that "there are three types of lies: lies, damned lies, and statistics. '34
While statistics and numbers can be used in misleading ways, the re-
search that follows strives to be straightforward in explanation and
transparent in method. The analytical methods and constructs used
do not necessitate much handling of the data or require sophisticated
interpretation. 35
the total award. When a noneconomic damage award was given as part of the total, this was
recorded separately in the data analyzed for this Comment. If no such breakdown was given in
the record then only the total was recorded.
33. The jury, over the course of centuries, has evolved from a qualified grouping drawn from
society's elite that relied on their knowledge of the parties (and the disputed matter) in the
English system, to a neutral factfinder in our current system, drawn from the laity and charged
with rendering a decision outside the construct of the juror's personal knowledge or biases. See
Stephan Landsman, The Civil Jury in America: Scenes from an Unappreciated History, 44 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 579, 582-92, 617-18 (1993).
34. Raj Devasaguyam, Professor of Int'l Bus., St. Norbert Coll., Introductory Lecture on Busi-
ness Statistics (Sept. 27, 2001). The phrase originated with Leonard Henry Courtney in a piece
written near the turn of the twentieth century for the London periodical the National Review, in
which he argued in favor of proportional representation of the electorate in the British House of
Commons. See Leonard Courtney, To My Fellow-Disciples at Saratoga Springs, 26 NAT'L REV.
21, 25 (1895).
35. This study is short on mathematical operation. Rather, the inferences made here can be
found through the simple aggregation of decisions by year, judge, or type of claim. Calculations
were kept to a minimum as a means of strengthening the arguments; performing a set of compli-
cated statistical techniques might yield some interesting results, but it would also make this anal-
ysis subject to charges of statistical manipulation.
There are also a few caveats that need to be discussed. A study is only as good as the data and
analytical techniques upon which it is based. While the results here are fair, reliable, and pro-
vide an intriguing case study, the set of cases used is not an exhaustive list of decisions. The
Verdict Reporter captures cases from 1992 until the present, so this is only a twelve- to thirteen-
year sample of the data as of this writing in the Fall of 2005. Next, Westlaw notes that while its
reporter covers nearly all the decisions rendered from the included jurisdictions over that time
period, it does not include every decision. Third, this data set only includes data on cases where
a claim was actually filed. A significant number of cases never reach this point because they are
settled. See infra note 128 and accompanying text. Therefore, assertions made about jury ver-
dicts' role in increased settlements will remain unanswered after this study. Finally, the Bureau
of Justice Statistics' study, Tort Trials and Verdicts in Large Counties, 2001, is used as a proxy for
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The data this Comment relies upon consists of (1) jury verdicts and
awards from the Southwestern Illinois Jury Verdict Reporter (Verdict
Reporter), (2) appellate court decisions, (3) information on the five-
and ten-year Treasury Bond rates, used to assess the correlation be-
tween insurance companies' premiums and their investment income, 36
and (4) a Bureau of Justice Statistics report.37 The case decisions
listed in the Verdict Reporter were gathered and compiled, capturing
the relevant information about each case. A spreadsheet listed the
case name, the year of the decision, the type of claim, the name of the
presiding judge, the county of the trial, whether the case was in fed-
eral or state court, whether the case was against a corporate defen-
dant, the total award given, and a breakdown of the award into
economic, noneconomic, and punitive damages where available. 38
Additionally, if the parties settled the case after a claim was filed, the
settlement was noted, along with the amount of the settlement, if
available. With this data set, it was possible to determine, in the ag-
gregate, whether certain types of cases were susceptible to larger
awards, whether certain courts tended to give more generous awards
than others, and whether federal and state courts handled claims dif-
ferently. This method allows one to isolate trends in the decisions not
easily perceived when one looks at a single case.
Though an in-depth statistical analysis is not required here, an ex-
planation of the statistical concepts employed is warranted. 39 It is im-
"national" data. This study, while capturing data from many of the busiest jurisdictions in the
United States, does not capture them all. It is a useful reference in comparing plaintiffs' relative
successes against some kind of meaningful national average, but it is not a true national average.
36. The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis maintains a comprehensive data bank, containing
thousands of economic and financial data series, called the FRED® Database. See St. Louis
Fed: Economic Data-FRED®, http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/ (last visited June 10, 2007).
37. Thomas H. Cohen, Tort Trials and Verdicts in Large Counties, 2001, BUREAU OF JUST.
STAT. BULL. (U.S. Dep't of Justice, Wash., D.C.), Nov. 2004, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.
gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ttvlcOl.pdf.
38. Adam G. Winters, Southwestern Illinois Jury Verdict Reporter Decision Compilation (Nov.
18, 2004) (unpublished data compilation of decisions from Westlaw's Southwestern Illinois Jury
Verdict Reporter database) (on file with the DePaul Law Review) [hereinafter Winters, Decision
Compilation].
39. This Comment attempts to ensure that the analysis remains clear, to the extent possible, of
statistical or economic jargon. However, there is one concept that is a central piece of the analy-
sis that follows: statistical correlation. Statistical correlation addresses the magnitude and "di-
rection" of the relationship between two variables, usually expressed as a decimal, with the
range of eligible values between -1 and +1. See LEvrir & DUBNER, supra note 1, at 10; see also
JEFFREY M. WOOLRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: A MODERN APPROACH 681-82
(2000). The greater the magnitude, the stronger the relationship. Id. The direction is expressed
by a positive or negative correlation percentage (the "correlation coefficient"), indicating
whether the relationship is inverse or "direct." Id. An inverse relationship exists where, as one
set of variables increases, the other generally decreases, and vice versa. Id. A direct relationship
is one where the variables seem to move in the same direction together. Id. An oft-cited exam-
[Vol. 56:13471352
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portant in reading the analysis not to confuse correlation with
causation. Correlation is useful to show the existence and relative
strength of a relationship between two variables, but it does not indi-
cate whether one variable caused the other.4 0 It is important to bear
in mind that correlations show the existence of a relationship, and can
allow inferences into cause, but do not show causation empirically.
C. A Survey of the Battlefield
A March 2005 Harris Poll indicated that 34% to 41% of Americans
favored President Bush's plans for tort reform in the United States.
41
The responses broke sharply along party lines, with 69% of Republi-
cans approving of reform and only 22% of Democrats and 39% of
self-described Independents favoring such measures. The results of
this poll offer a useful snapshot of where the country stood on the
issue of tort reform at that time.
This is not simply an abstract or ideological debate; it is an impor-
tant and politically divisive issue. One member of Congress placed
the cost of tort litigation at $233 billion in 2002, a figure greater than
the entire economy of Greece.42 Both political parties spent roughly
pie of an inverse relationship would be that between the stock market and the average length of
women's skirts. As the stock market increases in value, the average length of skirts at the time
decreases. See Texas A&M Univ., Statistics Dep't, Correlation & Causation, http://www.stat.
tamu.edu/stat30x/notes/node42.html (last visited June 10, 2007) (noting the "Skirt Length Hy-
pothesis" example).
40. See LEvr-r & DUBNER, supra note 1, at 10. Despite the simplified explanation above,
there is a more technical element at work in a discussion of correlation that, while not necessary
to understanding the research presented here, is necessary to include in the interest of complete-
ness. In order to assert that a correlative relationship exists, it must first be proven to a reasona-
ble level of statistical certainty that the correlation coefficient is what it is said to be. In order to
do so, a correlation coefficient must be proven to be statistically different from zero. See WOOL-
RIDGE, supra note 39, at 680-82, 724-35. This is accomplished by inputting the coefficient being
tested into the following formula in order to compare the result to a critical value. If the value is
greater than this threshold, the coefficient is said to be "statistically significant" and we can trust
that the correlation is statistically different from zero. Id. If the value is less than the critical
value, then we cannot say the coefficient is statistically different from zero with enough certainty
in order to trust the coefficient's value. Id. The relevant test is as follows:
"Two-Tailed Test": To: x - 0 ("Null Hypothesis")
TI: x 0,
Tsig = r , where r = the correlation coefficient and
4(1 - rz) / (n-2) (n-2) = relevant "degrees of freedom"
41. The Harris Poll was conducted in March of 2005, surveying a cross-section of 2630 Ameri-
cans over the age of eighteen. The poll had a sampling error of plus or minus two percentage
points. For the full results of the survey, including those above, see Harris Interactive, The
Harris Poll-Of the Six Major Domestic Policy Positions of President, Social Security Is Most
Unpopular (Mar. 18, 2005), http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris.poll/index.asp?PID=551.
42. Michael I. Krauss & Robert A. Levy, Can Tort Reform and Federalism Coexist?, 514
POL'Y ANALYSIS (CATO Inst., Wash., D.C.), Apr. 2004, at 1, 2. The Gross Domestic Product of
2007] 1353
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$4.5 million in the first six months of 2005 on tort reform-related ad-
vertisements.4 3 This is more than was spent on Alberto Gonzalez's
nomination for Attorney General, John Bolton's heavily contested
nomination for U.N. Ambassador, and the heated debate over filibus-
tering President Bush's judicial nominees. 44  In fact, it represents
about half of what groups have spent on issues related to Social Secur-
ity over the same period.45 More important than the sheer number of
advertisements, however, is the veracity of what is being said and how
it has shaped our conventional wisdom on the subject of tort reform.
D. On Message
Fashioning an effective message starts from the top down. Presi-
dent George W. Bush, during his first term in office and throughout
the campaign for his second term, consistently repeated that the tort
system in this country was broken and that the juries and plaintiffs'
attorneys responsible needed to be checked. 46 The message was im-
portant enough that it was included in the President's State of the
Union Address in 2001,47 2003,48-2004, 49 and 2005.50 The President
Greece was estimated at $232.5 million in 2006. See United States Central Intelligence Agency,
The World Fact Book-Greece, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/
geos/gr.html (last visited June 10, 2007).
43. Matthew Swibel, Airing It Out, FORBES, July 25, 2005, at 62 (citing statistics tracked by
TNS Media Intelligence-CMAG).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See infra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
47. Transcript of the State of the Union Address of the President to the Joint Session of Con-
gress (Feb. 27, 2001), http://www.c-span.org/executive/transcript.asp?cat=currentevent&code=
bushadmin&year=2001 ("[L]et's put in place a strong, independent review so we promote qual-
ity health care, not frivolous lawsuits.").
48. Transcript of the State of the Union Address of the President to the Joint Session of Con-
gress (Jan. 28, 2003), http://www.c-span.org/executive/transcript.asp?cat=currentevent&code=
bushadmin&year=2003 ("Instead of bureaucrats, and trial lawyers, and HMOs, we must put
doctors, and nurses, and patients back in charge of American medicine. ... To improve our
health care system, we must address one of the prime causes of higher costs-the constant threat
that physicians and hospitals will be unfairly sued. Because of excessive litigation, everybody
pays more for health care-and many parts of America are losing fine doctors. No one has ever
been healed by a frivolous lawsuit-and I urge the Congress to pass medical liability reform.").
49. Transcript of the State of the Union Address of the President to the Joint Session of Con-
gress (Jan. 20, 2004), http://www.c-span.org/executive/transcript.asp?cat=currentevent&code=
bushadmin&year=2004 ("To protect the doctor-patient relationship, and keep good doctors do-
ing good work, we must eliminate wasteful and frivolous medical lawsuits.").
50. Transcript of the State of the Union Address of the President to the Joint Session of Con-
gress (Feb. 2, 2005), http://www.c-span.org/executive/transcript.asp?cat=currentevent&code=
bushadmin&year=2005 ("To make our economy stronger and more competitive, America must
reward, not punish, the efforts and dreams of entrepreneurs. Small business is the path of ad-
vancement, especially for women and minorities, so we must free small businesses from needless
regulation and protect honest job-creators from junk lawsuits. Justice is distorted, and our econ-
1354
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even came to Illinois in January 2005 to demonstrate his concern, de-
livering a speech from inside the "Judicial Hellhole" of Madison
County.51 He began by rallying the supporters, including many physi-
cians from local hospitals, and repeated what had become his mantra:
"Many of the costs that we're talking about don't start in an examin-
ing room or an operating room. They start in a courtroom. 52
The President's message, however, has not been based on the theo-
retical or the abstract. He has tried to bring the message home to
those in the audience: "Because junk lawsuits are so unpredictable,
they drive up insurance costs for all doctors .... [Y]ou're paying for
junk lawsuits every time you go to see your doctor. That's the effect
of all the lawsuits. It affects your wallet."' 53 The end result is the utter
destruction of the health system in Illinois as we know it: "[Physicians
must] give up medicine entirely, or to [sic] move to another place
.... "54 Either choice, the President continued, leaves those in need
with fewer options: "In 2003, almost half of all American hospitals
lost physicians or reduced services because of medical liability con-
cerns .... Over the past two years, the liability crisis has forced out
about 160 physicians in Madison and St. Clair Counties alone. 55
The President set the tone for the debate, and he used a symbolic
pulpit to frame the discussion. 56 He was not the only one, however,
carrying the banner of tort reform in Illinois and around the nation.
ATRA, the group that coined the phrase "Judicial Hellhole," plays a
significant role in the dissemination of tort reform information and
ideas throughout the country.57 The group describes "Judicial Hel-
omy is held back by irresponsible class-actions and frivolous asbestos claims-and I urge Con-
gress to pass legal reforms this year.").
51. Press Release, supra note 9.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. It would be unfair, however, to criticize the President as if he is the only one guilty of
political hyperbole. After all, it was Democratic presidential hopeful Vice President Al Gore
who told CNN's Late Edition that he "took the initiative in creating the Internet." Interview by
Wolf Blitzer with Al Gore, Vice President of the United States, in Wash., D.C. (Mar. 9, 1999),
http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/1999/03/09/president.2000/transcript.gore/.
56. For other highlights from the President's address, see Press Release, supra note 9.
57. The American Tort Reform Foundation (ATRF) and its subsidiary organization, ATRA,
both claim to support tort reform measures, including damage caps and restrictions on class
actions, in order to promote greater predictability in the civil justice system. Interestingly, the
groups receive a significant amount of their funding through donations from a group called the
Carthage Foundation, a subsidiary of the Sarah Scaife Foundation. See Media Transparency,
Recipient Grants: The American Tort Reform Foundation, http://www.mediatransparency.org/
recipientgrants.php?recipientlD=1377 (last visited June 10, 2007). According to the watchdog
group Media Transparency, the Scaife Foundation has been a primary backer of politically con-
servative groups and causes since 1973, donating more than $17.6 million to one hundred and
20071 1355
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
lholes" as "places where judges systematically apply laws and court
procedures in an unfair and unbalanced manner, generally against de-
fendants. ' 58 The 2004 report from ATRA was particularly critical of
Illinois, listing Madison County and St. Clair County, respectively, as
numbers one and two on their list of the worst jurisdictions in the
United States.59 The report was quick to point out what they consid-
ered unfair tactics: "In Madison County, Illinois, for example, judges
are known for scheduling numerous cases against a defendant to start
on the same day or only giving defendants a week or so notice of
when a trial is to begin." 60 ATRA also makes several inferences
about the cases being filed: "Records also showed that 85% of medi-
cal malpractice claims closed in St. Clair County between 1999 and
2003 resulted in no payment to the plaintiff, demonstrating that many
of the accusations against doctors are unfounded. '61 The assumption
is that any claim that results in no award is a meritless one-a recur-
ring theme among those pushing for tort reform. Their prognosis is
similar to that of the President: "This year, seventy-nine physicians
left or are planning to leave Madison County, and most blame their
departures on rising medical malpractice insurance costs." '62
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) re-
cently entered the fray on tort reform as well. In its 2002 report, HHS
assigned underhanded motives to damage claims, arguing that "com-
pensation for intangible losses, such as pain and suffering, loss of con-
sortium, hedonic (loss of the enjoyment of life) damages, and various
other theories.., are imaginatively created by lawyers to increase the
amount awarded. '63 The result of this legal ingenuity, the report con-
tinues, is a diversion of insurance funds from the hands of the injured
to the pockets of the trial lawyers: "[O]nly 28% of what they pay for
insurance coverage actually goes to patients; 72% is spent on legal,
administrative, and related costs."64
fifty conservative think tanks in 1993 alone. See Media Transparency, Sarah Scaife Foundation,
http://www.mediatransparency.org/funderprofile.php?funderlD=3 (last visited June 10, 2007).
This information is not intended to discredit the ATRF, but to allow readers to better evaluate
the ATRF's reports for themselves.
58. ATRA, JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2004, supra note 10, at 4.
59. Id. at 7.
60. Id. at 9.
61. Id. at 19 (citation omitted).
62. Id. at 16.
63. OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC'Y FOR PLANNING & EVALUATION, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVS., CONFRONTING THE NEW HEALTH CARE CRISIS: IMPROVING HEALTH CARE
QUALITY AND LOWERING COSTS By FIXING OUR MEDICAL LIABILITY SYSTEM 8 (2002), availa-
ble at http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/litrefm.pdf [hereinafter OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC'Y
FOR PLANNING & EVALUATION, HEALTH CARE CRISIS].
64. Id. at 11.
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The fact that these statements come from an administrative body to
which we entrust many of our most intimate health and safety issues65
certainly weighs heavily on the minds of their audience. Furthermore,
unlike ATRA, the HHS report comes with a stamp of approval from
the government, which adds to the perceived legitimacy of the claims.
Administrative bodies like HHS are usually thought to be indepen-
dent of the political arena; their statements are invested with an air of
objectivity and are not readily discounted by listeners.
Secretary of the Treasury John Snow discussed his own views on the
subject of tort reform while addressing ATRA's annual membership
meeting. 66 His remarks took trial lawyers and the entire tort system
to task, blaming them for hurting individuals and small businesses,
and even for increasing the effective tax burden borne by the citizens
of this country. 67 The Secretary pressed further, striking at those he
believed responsible: "[Some personal injury lawyers] are taking in
billions of dollars in profits each year. Some individuals in this indus-
try are known to collect fees of $30,000 an hour. ' 68 The Secretary
even drew an analogy between attorneys and the infamous corporate
criminals who ran Enron and WorldCom. 69 This is by no means an
exhaustive accounting of the criticisms volleyed at the tort system or
those who work in it; they are, however, representative of the general
climate.
This is not to say that these are the only voices speaking out on the
issue. Some oppose the reform measures suggested by the President
and others.70 None of these voices, however, carry the same weight
65. Among the responsibilities of HHS are the safety of our medication and food supply,
immunization services, the prevention of domestic violence, and medical preparedness in case of
emergency. For a full description of HHS activities, see U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
What We Do, http://www.hhs.gov/about/whatwedo.html (last visited June 10, 2007).
66. See Press Release, supra note 31.
67. Specifically, Secretary Snow stated that "there are few things that create a greater disin-
centive to job creation than an atmosphere where little stands between every business owner,
every manager, ever[y] doctor and professional of almost any kind .. .and the next frivolous
lawsuit." Id. (alterations in original). As for the effective tax, which he labeled a "tort tax," the
Secretary argued, "We know that the current tort system is costing America well over $200
billion each year ... that's a tort tax-paid in the form of lower wages, higher product prices,
and reduced investments-of $809 for every individual." Id. (alteration in original).
68. Id.
69. Id. ("The lack of personal ethics and responsibility, the excesses of greed, is similar to
what we saw when corporate scandals erupted two years ago .... ").
70. Most of the commentary on the other side has acknowledged the existence of a problem,
but not in the civil justice .system. Rather, much of the attention has been given to the insurance
premiums charged to doctors for medical malpractice and to the insurance industry in general.
See, e.g., Scott E. Harrington, Tort Liability, Insurance Rates, and the Insurance Cycle, in BROOK-
INGs-WHARTON PAPERS ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 2004, at 97 (Robert E. Litan & Richard Her-
ring eds., 2004) (discussing the insurance underwriting cycle and its correlation to premium
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with the average American as the President, the Secretary of the Trea-
sury, or HHS. The President's message was clear: "frivolous law-
suits" are costing people money, taking away their jobs, and
threatening to leave them without access to doctors. Of course, most
of the evidence concerning premiums or the physician exodus is anec-
dotal.71 But it is not hard to see how this idea has become a part of
our national consciousness, and why some have begun to feel as
though Madison County and St. Clair County are unfair places in
need of serious reform. And, since the descriptions sound like things
we have already heard about trial attorneys, the idea is readily assimi-
lated in people's minds and slowly converted to fact.
According to the 2005 Harris Poll, the voices on the other side have
not been as effective as the media onslaught. 72 This, of course, says
little about which side is correct. In reality, both sides are incorrect on
different points, as the data will show. But the poll results do show
that President Bush and the other proponents of tort reform have
levels). The contention of many who oppose tort reform measures is that insurance companies,
like most businesses, are susceptible to business cycles and that underperforming returns from
the invested premiums have caused losses, which insurers then seek to recover through rate
hikes. See, e.g., Patricia M. Danzon et al., The Crisis in Medical Malpractice Insurance, in
BROOKINOS-WHARTON PAPERS ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 2004, supra, at 55 (concluding that high
payouts have not contributed to the premium increases, and citing evidence that medical mal-
practice insurers did not set aside sufficient reserves to weather the market declines of the late
1990s as an explanation for rising premiums); see also VIDMAR, TORT SYsTEM REPORT, supra
note 8, at 2 ("The end result, these groups claim, is that when economic fluctuations in the
business cycle squeeze income, the insurers raise their rates and blame plaintiff lawyers and
juries." (citing Joseph Treaster & Joel Brinkley, Behind Those Medical Malpractice Rate Hikes,
CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Feb. 22, 2005, at 1)). Still others oppose the reform measures, and damage
caps specifically, because evidence suggests that the effect of such caps would fall disproportion-
ately on women, children, and the elderly, whose losses are more likely to be classified as
noneconomic. See, e.g., Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform: Women, Chil-
dren, and the Elderly, 53 EMORY L.J. 1263, 1280-82 (2004) (arguing that women, children, and
minorities tend to suffer injuries that are classified as noneconomic).
71. See Press Release, supra note 9. The President, for example, pointed to specific individu-
als he felt were affected:
Dr. Chris Heffner is with us. He's a neurosurgeon from Belleville Memorial and St.
Elizabeth Hospitals. Raise your hand, Doc. He is one of only two neurosurgeons still
practicing south of Springfield, Illinois....
A few years ago, Chris decided that closing his head trauma part of his practice was
the only way he could afford to stay in this area.
Id. The President continued:
Dr. Greg Gabliani is with us. He's from Alton, and he is a cardiologist. He was raised
in Quincy and he moved to Madison County in 2001, even though his colleagues
warned him about the medical liability crisis here. In three years, his premiums have
risen from $12,500 to $60,000 a year-three quick years. Last year he had to stop per-
forming certain procedures to bring his costs under control. He said, "You either have
to change the nature of your practice or you have to leave."
Id.
72. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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been much more effective in staying on message and delivering it to
the people. 73 According to this account, the end of the tort system as
we know it may be near. The only problem is that the President's
message is not supported by the data.
III. ANALYSIS
It would be impossible to discuss and assess the validity of every
statement made about the tort crisis-or lack thereof-in Illinois. In-
stead, the many assertions have been grouped under general catego-
ries of criticism of the tort system in Madison County and St. Clair
County to facilitate a more manageable discussion. Each of the fol-
lowing sections begins with a common statement or observation about
the tort system and then conducts a full examination of the assertion's
accuracy.74
A. Madison County and St. Clair County Courts
Are Full of "Junk Lawsuits"
This is a common criticism of not only the tort system in Illinois, but
of our civil justice system generally. It is, however, an inherently qual-
itative criticism and difficult to test without careful definition. The
veracity of this statement depends on one's definition of "junk" in a
legal context. It also raises difficulty because people's opinions vary
with regard to how many lawsuits are "too many." That said, working
through the data provides some objective measure by which to reach
one's own evaluation of the statement above.
According to the sample in the Verdict Reporter, there were 238
tort-related verdicts in Madison County, St. Clair County, and the
Southern District of Illinois between 1992 and October 2005.75 This is
the equivalent of roughly 20 verdicts per year over the sample period.
Comparatively, according to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the
county of Suffolk, Massachusetts (a county of similar population to
that of the combined Madison and St. Clair population) had 79 and 41
tort cases decided in 1996 and 2001, respectively.76 Moreover, the
73. Id.
74. Again, when the Madison and St. Clair data is compared to "national" data, the Bureau of
Justice Statistics' Tort Trials and Verdicts in Large Counties, 2001 is being used as a proxy to
estimate the national average. See supra note 35.
75. Winters, Decision Compilation, supra note 38.
76. See Marika F.X. Litras et al., Tort Trials and Verdicts in Large Counties, 1996, BUREAU OF
JUST. STAT. BULL. (U.S. Dep't of Justice, Wash., D.C.), Aug. 2000, app. A at 13, available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.govfbjs/pub/pdf/ttvlc96.pdf; Cohen, supra note 37, app. B at 11. According
to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, Suffolk, Massachusetts had an average population over the
three samples of 642,130. By comparison, the U.S. Census Bureau places the estimated 2004
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bulk of the cases in Madison County and St. Clair County came near
the beginning of the sample, with the levels of claims falling signifi-
cantly in recent years. In 1992 and 1993, there were 39 and 38 ver-
dicts, respectively.77 Compare that to 1998 (6), 1999 (13), 2000 (11),
2001 (4), 2002 (6), and 2003 (3).78 This discussion only addresses
those contained in the Verdict Reporter sample, but the low number of
actual cases and the precipitous decline in their occurrence are telling.
The "junk" portion of this observation seems to address a broader
claim that many of the tort claims being filed in Madison County and
St. Clair County are frivolous. A "frivolous lawsuit" is defined as a
"lawsuit having no legal basis, often filed to harass or extort money
from the defendant. '79 This definition, however, is often perverted in
political speech to equate frivolous claims with those that simply do
not receive an award.80 This is an error of transposed logic.
Further, of the 238 total verdicts in this sample, judges or juries in
93 cases (39%) found enough merit in the claim to actually find for
the plaintiff and award damages.8' This is somewhat lower than, but
still comparable to, the 52% success rate for tort plaintiffs nationally
in 2001.82 Also, the research did not uncover any instance in which an
attorney who brought an unsuccessful tort suit subsequently faced a
successful Rule 11 proceeding under the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure (or its Illinois equivalent) for filing a nonmeritorious claim. 83
populations of Madison County and St. Clair County at 264,350 and 259,132, respectively, a total
of 523,482. See U.S. Census Bureau, State & County Quick Facts: Madison County, Illinois,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/17/17119.html (last visited June 10, 2007); U.S. Census Bu-
reau, State & County Quick Facts: St. Clair County, Illinois, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/
states/17/17163.html (last visited June 10, 2007). While not a perfect match numerically, Suffolk
County provides the closest comparison among the counties captured in all three studies of the
Bureau of Justice Statistics.
77. See Winters, Decision Compilation, supra note 38.
78. Id.
79. BLACK'S LAW DICrTONARY, supra note 25, at 1475.
80. ATRA, JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2004, supra note 10, at 19.
81. See Winters, Decision Compilation, supra note 38.
82. See Cohen, supra note 37, at 4 tbl.3. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the
success rate for plaintiffs nationally was 52% in both 1992 and 2001. Id.
83. Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows sanctions against one who vio-
lates one of the representations embodied in pleadings to the court:
[A]n attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the cir-
cumstances,-(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass
or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; (2) the
claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or
by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law
or the establishment of new law; (3) the allegations and other factual contentions have
evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary sup-
port after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery ....
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Thus, Madison County and St. Clair County are not litigating as many
cases as similarly sized jurisdictions, nor are the courts seemingly
overwhelmed by "junk" lawsuits, unless one considers all unsuccessful
claims to be frivolous.
B. The Courts in Madison County and St. Clair County
Are Tilted in Favor of Plaintiffs
As discussed above, plaintiffs in these counties won only 93 of the
238 cases (39%) in the sample, while defendants won 61% of the
time.84 The plaintiffs' success rate is lower than the national rate of
52% cited in the 2001 Bureau of Justice Statistics study.8 5 While the
aggregate view is helpful, it does not explain the whole story. To de-
termine whether a jurisdiction is actually biased, it is instructive to
consider how different courts handled similar claims over time, and
then to compare the results to nationwide data.
In personal injury cases stemming from nonfatal auto accidents,
there were a total of 45 claims brought in Madison County and St.
Clair County.86 Plaintiffs won 10 of these, a 28% success rate. 87 Na-
tionally, however, plaintiffs won about 61% of auto accident cases,88 a
rate more than twice that of plaintiffs in Madison County and St. Clair
County. Turning to the hotly debated issue of medical malpractice
claims, a similar story emerges. There were 44 claims of medical neg-
ligence or malpractice filed over the thirteen-year sample, or roughly
3 claims per year for all of Madison County, St. Clair County, and the
FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b). The Illinois equivalent is reflected in Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137:
Every pleading, motion and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be
signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose address shall be
stated.... The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he
has read the pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, infor-
mation, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is
warranted by existing law or a good-faith argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as
to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If
a pleading, motion, or other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed
promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a
pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon
motion or upon its own initiative, may impose upon the person who signed it, a repre-
sented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to
the other party or parties the amount of reasonable expenses incurred because of the
filing of the pleading, motion or other paper, including a reasonable attorney fee.
ILL. Sup. CT. R. 137.
84. See Winters, Decision Compilation, supra note 38.
85. See Cohen, supra note 37, at 4 tbl.3.
86. See Winters, Decision Compilation, supra note 38.
87. Id.
88. See Cohen, supra note 37, at 4 tbl.3.
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Southern District of Illinois.89 Of these, plaintiffs won 13 (one verdict
per year), a plaintiff success rate of 29%.90 This is only marginally
higher than the national success rate for medical malpractice claims of
roughly 27%,91 suggesting that judges and juries in Southern Illinois
are no more plaintiff-friendly than those across the country.
Another sharply criticized area of tort law has been products liabil-
ity.92 These cases have become the topic of discussion around dinner
tables and water coolers, while providing fodder for the debate about
meritless lawsuits and greater consumer or user protection. 93 In the
Verdict Reporter sample here, products liability claims were filed for
defects found in a range of products, from car transmissions94 to
toothpaste.95 A total of 44 cases were filed in this sample, with the
plaintiffs prevailing in 21 cases, a 47% success rate.96 Nationally,
plaintiffs fair about the same, winning 44% of claims filed.97
There is one area of products liability, however, where plaintiffs do
exceedingly well: asbestos claims. Nationally, plaintiffs in asbestos
89. See Winters, Decision Compilation, supra note 38.
90. Id.
91. See Cohen, supra note 37, at 4 tbl.3.
92. See supra note 50.
93. See Liebeck v. McDonald's Rests., CV-93-02419, 1995 WL 360309 (D.N.M. Aug. 18, 1994).
This is the infamous case where Stella Liebeck sued McDonald's Corporation after spilling a cup
of hot coffee on herself. Ms. Liebeck was awarded $200,000 in compensatory damages (reduced
to $160,000 upon finding her 20% at fault) and $2.7 million in punitive damages (which was later
reduced to $480,000). Id. at *1. Many Americans were outraged by the verdict. See Andrea
Gerlin, A Matter of Degree: How a Jury Decided That a Coffee Spill Is Worth $2.9 Million, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 1, 1994, at Al. And why shouldn't they be? This woman was just made a million-
aire! The jurors themselves may have been just as outraged had they not been in court for the
presentation of evidence. "[Wihile removing the lid to add cream and sugar," the coffee spilled
onto Ms. Liebeck's lap, "causing third-degree burns of the groin, inner thighs, and buttocks." Id.
Ms. Liebeck spent "seven days in the hospital," underwent skin grafts to repair the damage, and
had to receive excruciating debridement surgery (removal of the damaged layers of skin from
the body). Id. However, after all of that, Ms. Liebeck, who had never filed a suit in her life, still
would not have done so if McDonald's would not have "dismissed her request for compensation
for pain and medical bills with an offer of $800." Id. The punitive damages were the result of
evidence showing that, "in the past decade McDonald's had received at least 700 reports" of
people burning themselves, often severely, demonstrating that the company was aware of the
serious risk but made a decision not to alter its operations. Id. In addition, other evidence
showed that coffee brewed at 195' to 205', as McDonald's brewed it, "takes less than three
seconds to produce a third-degree burn." Id. On these facts, it took the jury only four hours to
reach a decision, ultimately awarding $2.7 million in punitive damages (the equivalent of two
days' worth of McDonald's coffee sales). Gerlin, supra.
94. BelI-Reichert v. Ford Motor Co., No. 01-L-1261, 2002 WL 32500425 (I11. Cir. Madison
County Ct. Nov. 22, 2002).
95. Benyr v. Colgate Palmolive Toothpaste, No. 89-L-1077, 1992 WL 12006058 (I11. Cir. St.
Clair County Ct. July 31, 1992).
96. See Winters, Decision Compilation, supra note 38.
97. Cohen, supra note 37, at 4 tbl.3.
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claims win upwards of 60% of the time.98 There were a total of 8
asbestos claims in this sample, with the plaintiffs winning 7 (87.5%).
This is significantly higher than the national average, but the percent-
age may be misleading given the relatively small sample size. Of these
8 claims, 5 were filed the same year against a single company, with the
company being found liable in each instance.99 In any case, asbestos
litigation in Madison County, St. Clair County, and the Southern Dis-
trict of Illinois seems to be becoming far less frequent, as there were
only 2 asbestos cases captured in the last decade of the sample.100
Almost the entirety of the remaining case load in the sample is sim-
ple negligence claims. The majority of these cases involve premises
liability claims either by individuals or by workers who sued for inju-
ries resulting from unsafe working conditions. 101 Out of a total of 79
cases, plaintiffs won 34, a 43% success rate.10 2 The most analogous
category in the Bureau of Justice Statistics study is the category titled
"Premises Liability"; nationally, plaintiffs win approximately 42% of
these cases. 03
The next step is to determine what it all means. The claim has been
made that the system is slanted against defendants in Madison County
and St. Clair County.10 4 But this is a dubious statement, since plain-
tiffs prevail in only 39% of the cases. That said, the jurisdictions could
still be considered unfair if the Madison and St. Clair court decisions
were more plaintiff-friendly than other parts of the country. The
Madison and St. Clair courts, however, were within a few percentage
points of the respective national averages for each sort of claim, at
least based on the Bureau of Justice Statistics in 2001. There were
only two types of claims where the results were not comparable: auto-
mobile accidents and asbestos claims. As stated earlier, however, the
asbestos claims in Southern Illinois can be largely attributed to one
98. Id.
99. See Balmer v. Anchor Packing, No. 89-L-1102, 1992 WL 12006013 (Ill. Cir. Madison
County Ct. May 8, 1992); Pickering v. Anchor Packing, No. 90-L-1546, 1992 WL 12005986 (I11.
Cir. Madison County Ct. Apr. 13, 1992); Anderson v. Anchor Packing, No. 91-L-621, 1992 WL
12005986 (I11. Cir. Madison County Ct. Apr. 13, 1992); Osterman v. Anchor Packing, No. 91-L-
622, 1992 WL 12005986 (I11. Cir. Madison County Ct. Apr. 13, 1992); Dossett v. Anchor Packing,
No. 91-L-623, 1992 WL 12005986 (Ill. Cir. Madison County Ct. Apr. 13, 1992).
100. See Crawford & Crawford v. A.C. & S. Inc., No. 01-L-781, 2001 WL 34062365 (111. Cir.
Madison County Ct. Dec. 4, 2001); Hutcheson v. Shell Wood River Refinery, No. 99-L-450, 2000
WL 33957080 (111. Cir. Madison County Ct. Nov. 30, 2000).
101. See, e.g., Donnely v. Kurtz Constr. Co., No. 95-L-905, 1997 WL 33478658 (I11. Cir.
Madison County Ct. Jan. 10, 1997); Wakeford v. Rodehouse Rests., No. 85-L-165, 1994 WL
16007244 (Ill. Cir. Madison County Ct. Dec. 19, 1994).
102. See Winters, Decision Compilation, supra note 38.
103. Cohen, supra note 37, at 4 tbl.3.
104. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
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year and one defendant. As for automobile accidents, the data
showed that plaintiffs nationally were more than twice as likely to pre-
vail as those in the two biggest "Judicial Hellholes" in the country,
Madison County and St. Clair County. Consequently, the claims of
systemic imbalance in the Madison and St. Clair courts find little em-
pirical support in the data.
C. Noneconomic and Punitive Damages Are Out of Control and
Have Artificially Increased Awards
The HHS has gone so far as to claim that noneconomic damages,
such as pain and suffering or loss of consortium, "are imaginatively
created by lawyers to increase the amount awarded. ' ' 10 5 Steven
Stanek, a freelance writer with ties to pro7-reform publications and in-
stitutions such as the Health Care News and the Heartland Institute,
has extended this idea even further, claiming that "non-economic
damages . .. now make up more than 90 percent of the money
awarded by Illinois juries in malpractice cases.' 0 6 These criticisms all
stem from a concern over awarding damages for injuries that are not
readily quantifiable. Different people may rationally hold different
opinions on the proper goals of the tort system or theories of compen-
sation. But only the data concerning these awards in Illinois can de-
termine if there is an objective basis for concern.
Again, noneconomic damages are those that are not based on quan-
tifiable items; they include pain and suffering, loss of consortium, and
disfigurement. 10 7 Additionally, when noneconomic damages are spo-
ken of in the context of this research, any punitive damages that may
have been awarded are not included in the figures. In this sample, the
238 cases yielded total damage awards of $200,800,874, while
noneconomic damages constituted $42,062,540 (20.9%) of that to-
tal. 108 Clearly, Stanek's claim has little if any basis in the data. But
just because noneconomic damages do not account for most of the
total awards does not mean that, within certain claims, they are not
being awarded unduly.
105. See OFFIcE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC'Y FOR PLANNING & EVALUATION, HEALTH CARE
CRISIS, supra note 63, at 8.
106. Steve Stanek, Doctors Flee Illinois, HEALTH CARE NEWS, Apr. 2004, at 1.
107. See supra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
108. See Winters, Decision Compilation, supra note 38. In the sample, 41 of the 238 cases
provided for noneconomic damages in their award breakdowns. Noneconomic damages were
not estimated or inferred in the absence of an explicit statement in the case decision.
[Vol. 56:13471364
THE ILLINOIS TORT "CRISIS"
As for punitive damages, the story at first blush seems similar to
that of noneconomic damages.10 9 Of the $200,800,874 total damages
awarded, $43,976,751 (21.9%) came by way of punitive damages.'10
This percentage, however, is somewhat misleading. Overall, punitive
damages in the data set were exceedingly rare, with only 10 cases
(4%) awarding them.11' This is lower than, but still comparable to,
the national average of 5% of tort plaintiffs that receive punitive
damages.112
It should be further noted that of the $43,976,751 in punitive dam-
ages awarded, $39,500,000 (90% of the punitive damages) came from
5 asbestos verdicts, 113 including one for .$25,000,000.114 In that case,
the plaintiff developed mesothelioma from handling asbestos as di-
rected by his employer for fifteen years; the defendant company knew
of the dangers associated with handling the product but failed to warn
anyone or provide safer alternatives.a1' Excluding this single award,
which can be safely labeled as an outlier even for asbestos cases, puni-
tive damages account for less than 11% of damages awarded. 116
With regard to the actual punitive damage award figures, the me-
dian award given by Madison and St. Clair courts is $2,500,000.117 Na-
tionally, the median punitive damage award is precisely one-
hundredth of that value, $25,000.118 Again, however, viewing the
awards in the aggregate can be misleading because of the small num-
ber of punitive damage awards given and the inflationary effect of the
asbestos verdicts mentioned above. When the asbestos verdicts are
removed, the median award in Madison County and St. Clair County
plunges to $456,231.119 Given the extreme rarity of punitive awards
109. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347,
356-57 (2003) ("[Clourts and academic commentators on the whole do agree that there are two
prevailing justifications for punitive damages: punishment (or retribution) and deterrence.").
110. See Winters, Decision Compilation, supra note 38.
111. Id.
112. Cohen, supra note 37, at 1.
113. See Crawford & Crawford v. A.C. & S. Inc., No. 01-L-781, 2001 WL 34062365 (I11. Cir.
Madison County Ct. Dec. 4, 2001); Hutcheson v. Shell Wood River Refinery, No. 99-L-450, 2000
WL 33957080 (I1l. Cir. Madison County Ct. Nov. 30,2000); Anderson v. Anchor Packing, No. 91-
L-621, 1992 WL 12005986 (Ill. Cir. Madison County Ct. Apr. 13, 1992); Osterman v. Anchor
Packing, No. 91-L-622, 1992 WL 12005986 (Ill. Cir. Madison County Ct. Apr. 13, 1992); Dossett
v. Anchor Packing, No. 91-L-623, 1992 WL 12005986 (Ill. Cir. Madison County Ct. Apr. 13,
1992).
114. See Hutcheson, 2000 WL 33957080.
115. Id.
116. See Winters, Decision Compilation, supra note 38.
117. Id.
118. Cohen, supra note 37, at 1.
119. See Winters, Decision Compilation, supra note 38.
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generally, and their prevalence in only very specific types of claims,
the data do not appear to support a conclusion that punitive damages
are a menace to the economy or our tort system. Indeed, there have
been entire years that passed in Madison County and St. Clair County
without any punitive damages awarded. 120 The claim that such dam-
ages are out of control does not comport with the data. Though the
median in southern Illinois is above national levels, courts have been
relatively restrained in awarding exemplary damages, limiting them to
cases where the requisite malice or recklessness has been found. 121
D. Lawyers Bring Lawsuits in the Hope of
Winning the Verdict "Lottery"
Supporters of tort reform argue that the system encourages attor-
neys to roll the dice and file suit because, over the course of several
cases, the chances of winning a large verdict are high.122 Given some
of the headlines that grace our local newspapers after a large or sur-
prising jury award, this does not seem like an unreasonable position to
take.123 After analyzing the data, it may be true that the tort system,
especially in Illinois, is somewhat erratic in the remedies it provides to
plaintiffs. Though this is a relatively small sample, the empirical find-
ings suggest an inherent unpredictability among awards handed down
by the courts that this Comment examined.
As a matter of theory, the relative consistency of jury awards can be
difficult to test objectively; there are often jury awards that seem to be
larger than the facts would or should support. Fortunately, however,
standard deviation provides a way to empirically test the consistency
of a set of data points relative to an average or "mean" value. Simply
120. No punitive damages were awarded in Madison County, St. Clair County, or the South-
ern District of Illinois in 1992, 1996, 1998, 2002, 2004, or 2005. Id.
121. These are some of the elements usually listed as prerequisites for allowing a punitive
damage award. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DicrIONARY, supra note 25, at 418-19. In the Verdict
Reporter sample, the award of punitive damages was generally precipitated by the finding of
malice or recklessness. See, e.g., Hrysko v. Stein Steel Mill Serv., No. 02-L-850 (Ill. Cir. Madison
County Ct. June 18, 2003), 2003 WL 23871439 (finding recklessness in servicing a truck in the
middle of a county highway without the use of hazard lights, flares, or reflectors); Penberthy &
Walpole v. Price, No. 90-L-999, 1994 WL 16007225 (111. Cir. St. Clair County Ct. Sept. 15, 1994)
(finding recklessness in a driver operating a motor vehicle while having a blood alcohol level of
0.217, or two and a half times the legal limit, who crossed the center line and struck an oncoming
vehicle); Anderson v. Lessie Bates Day Care Ctr., No. 90-L-1355, 1994 WL 16007227 (I11. Cir. St.
Clair County Ct. June 3, 1994) (awarding punitive damages to a child molested by a day care
center employee after the employee was negligently rehired following prior complaints of sexual
abuse involving children).
122. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
123. See, e.g., Matt Baron, Elvis Impersonator Wins $600,000 Injury Lawsuit, CHI. TRIB., Oct.
26, 2005, at MI.
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stated, standard deviation tells us how spread out the values of a data
set are.12 4 A large standard deviation indicates that the data points
(here, award values) are widely spread out around the mean, while a
small standard deviation indicates that the data points are closely clus-
tered around the mean, suggesting a more uniform set of observa-
tions.12 5 This idea can be applied to analyze the predictability of jury
awards for a particular type of claim. If the set of awards has a small
standard deviation, the awards for injuries on those claims are more
clustered around some average and, thus, are more predictable. If the
standard deviation is high, then the awards vary widely around some
average value and are necessarily less predictable.
The standard deviation also allows us to determine what number of
the observations fall within one, two, three, or more standard devia-
tions from the mean.126 Assuming a "standard normal distribution" of
observations (characterized by a mean value of zero and a standard
deviation of one), we are able to say that 68.2% of observations in a
given sample lie within one standard deviation from the mean and
95.46% are within two standard deviations. 27 The predictability of
awards is an important consideration for potential litigants and for
tort reform more generally; it also offers a possible explanation for the
rising number of settlements.1 28 If an individual evaluates the predict-
ability of awards and can only be roughly 70% sure that, if he were to
lose his case, an award would fall within a relatively large range, he
would more likely settle the case than take a chance in court. Con-
versely, a smaller standard deviation means relatively more predict-
able awards and a greater ability for litigants on both sides to
124. JAMES T. MCCLAVE & FRANK H. DIETRICH, II, STATISTICS 38-39 (3d ed. 1985).
125. Id. at 42-43.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 44. A caveat is appropriate here. A "standard normal distribution" is a bell-
shaped curve characterized by a mean value of zero and a standard deviation of one as stated in
the text. Id. From a practical standpoint, however, juries can never award a negative amount, so
to the extent that there can never be negative values captured in the data set, we are ceasing to
describe a normal distribution. Given enough observations, we would expect a normal distribu-
tion, but both the geographical and temporal scope of this analysis make this a relatively limited
sample. That said, the assumption of a normal distribution is essential to make full use of the
statistical tools. Thus, while the awards are all necessarily positive, these concepts are still the
most useful in communicating the variability of awards and no statistical harm has been done in
making this assumption.
128. See David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Simple Proposal to Halve Litigation Costs, 91
VA. L. REV. 1721, 1725 n.6 (2005) ("Recent data on state courts show that about 96% of civil
cases are resolved without trial.").
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accurately evaluate the possible risks and benefits of trying the
case.
129
This Comment next considers the range of awards given for each
type of claim in order to judge the relative consistency of the system
as it relates to that claim. 130 A few words of caution, however, are
warranted. First, this portion of the analysis will focus solely on
awards in Madison County, St. Clair County, and the Southern Dis-
trict of Illinois. No national data will be analyzed here. Second, the
awards have been adjusted for inflation in order to give a depiction of
the award ranges uninfluenced by extraneous effects. 131 Third, no two
cases are precisely alike, so we would naturally expect to see some
variability in the awards provided. Finally, the dispersions are being
assessed in relatively broad categories (e.g., auto accidents causing in-
jury), meaning that cases with potentially very different facts are being
compared for the purposes of this analysis. Thus, while the analysis
provides some insights, a larger set of observations may produce dif-
ferent results.
With regard to auto accidents resulting in injury but not death, the
mean award provided was $1,141,676, with a standard deviation of
$851,831 after adjusting for inflation. 132 As a result we are only able
to say that 68% of the results lie between $289,844 and $1,993,507.133
129. This is especially true if the standard deviation is looked at in conjunction with the plain-
tiff success rate for a particular type of claim. In this way, both parties can look at the
probability of a plaintiff victory and subsequent award. A simple example may be helpful. Sup-
pose a sample of observations had a mean value of eight and a standard deviation of two. We
are then able to say that about 68% of the observations, without even looking at a single one but
based solely on this information, are between six and ten. We are also able to say with certainty
that about 95% of the observations are between four and twelve. Thus, in interpreting damage
awards, we are able to better predict the range in which the observations fall. This provides a
useful tool to determine how consistent the system has been in the past, as well as some insight
into where we may expect to see awards in the future (though the standard deviation is not set
up to empirically predict future results).
130. The calculation of the standard deviation of a "population" of data is as follows:
---- , where N = Number of Observations.
MCCLAVE & DIETRICH, supra note 124, at 39.
131. The values here have been adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price Index (CPI)
as the measure of inflation. The CPI uses a "basket" of consumer goods and measures the
changing cost of that basket over time to gauge the relative buying power of money.
132. See Winters, Decision Compilation, supra note 38.
133. These values were derived by taking the mean value of $1,141,676 ± the standard devia-
tion of $851,831, indicating how far one standard deviation could take us above and below the
mean. The second standard deviation would take us an additional $851,831 away from the mean
value both positively and negatively. Thus, two standard deviations from the mean, between
which roughly 95% of the values fall, would land at -$561,897.
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The remaining 32% will fall somewhere outside this range. To capture
95% of the results, we would need to broaden the award range to $0
and $2,845,338.134 This is a broad range and suggests some unpredict-
ability in the verdicts. The circumstances of the accidents, the people
involved, and the injuries sustained could vary substantially from case
to case, accounting for much of the variation. That said, individual
drivers or companies that send an employee out on the road may at
least assess their potential risk based on the unpredictability of awards
and the probability of a plaintiff victory (28.6°%).135
This result is further accentuated when examining auto accidents
that result in the death of the victim. In those cases, the mean award
handed down in Madison County and St. Clair County was $3,973,755,
with a standard deviation of $3,550,556.136 These cases are inherently
more unpredictable because the award will depend largely on who the
victim is.137 That said, the range of damages here is still startling. Ac-
cording to these numbers, a wrongful death automobile case is statisti-
cally as likely to award $423,198 as $7,524,311.138 These results may
also help explain why many of these cases tend to be settled out of
court rather than through litigation.
Medical malpractice also depends largely on factual circumstances
and the identity of the victim. As a result, the range of verdicts
handed down is large. The mean award given was $3,357,847, with a
standard deviation of $5,867,008.139 The broad range is in part due to
Coleman v. Touchette Regional Hospital, where the cervix of a mother
in labor failed to dilate beyond two centimeters. 140 The doctor at-
tempted to use vacuum suction on the baby's head fifteen times de-
spite the manufacturer's recommendation of no more than three. 141
A cesarean section was not performed in a timely fashion and the in-
fant suffered severe brain damage, which would require around-the-
clock nursing care for the rest of her life. 142 The total award in that
134. The standard deviation would suggest that the 95% range should actually be -$561,897
and $2,845,338. However, no jury is going to charge a plaintiff money, so the effective lower end
of the range is no award at all, or $0.
135. See Winters, Decision Compilation, supra note 38.
136. Id.
137. The economic loss caused by the death of a forty-five-year-old CEO of a Fortune 500
company making $2,500,000 per year with three young children at home would likely be much
higher than for a man making $38,000 per year as a school teacher. '
138. These numbers are again calculated by taking the mean value of $3,973,755 + the stan-
dard deviation of $3,550,556.
139. See Winters, Decision Compilation, supra note 38.
140. No. 01-CV-314, 2003 WL 23872859 (S.D. Ill. July 15, 2003).
141. Id.
142. Id.
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case, most of it for future medical expenses, was over $19,000,000.143
Keep this result in mind in assessing the range of medical malpractice
awards. The mean and standard deviation above indicate that 68% of
the damages awards for medical malpractice will fall between $0 and
$9,224,856. If the Coleman case were removed from the sample, the
mean award in medical malpractice cases would fall to $1,990,376,
with a standard deviation of $3,321,348.144 This is a much tighter clus-
tering, and thus a more predictable range, than originally suggested.
The last broad category of claims to analyze is products liability.
Above, this Comment made the distinction within products liability
between asbestos claims and others. 145 Plaintiffs are vastly more suc-
cessful in asbestos suits than in others, thus making an overall prod-
ucts liability analysis misleading. In analyzing the variability of
awards, this distinction is no longer needed; awards in asbestos and all
other products liability claims disperse similarly around their respec-
tive means.146 The mean award for products liability cases generally
was $4,904,889, with a standard deviation of $8,546,816.147 This indi-
cates that 68% of the awards fall between $0 and $13,451,705. It is
worth mentioning, however, that products liability cases are relatively
rare; the sample contained only 21 such claims for the entire thirteen-
year span. 148
In summation, though this analysis was inhibited by a small data set,
the results support the claim that awards are somewhat unpredictable.
But in many of the cases involving huge damage awards, which influ-
ence both the mean and the predictability calculations, the result can-
not be said to have been wholly unwarranted. 149 This analysis also
shows empirically what many in the legal community already know:
individual facts matter. Each one of the cases provides a set of cir-
143. Id.
144. See Winters, Decision Compilation, supra note 38.
145. See supra notes 92-100 and accompanying text.
146. In the interest of completeness, the following are the respective standards of deviation
for asbestos claims and all other products liability clams. For asbestos cases, the mean award was
$9,956,520, with a standard deviation of $13,200,115. This suggests that 68.2% of the awards fall
between $0 and $23,156,635. For the rest of the claims, the mean award was $2,379,073 with a
standard deviation of $3,369,017. The 68.2% demarcation in this case is $0 to $5,748,091. Each
case presents a significant range, especially in asbestos cases, where the injuries can be life
threatening and the incident medical care can be significant.
147. See Winters, Decision Compilation, supra note 38.
148. See id.
149. See Hutcheson v. Shell Wood River Refinery, No. 99-L-450, 2000 WL 33957080 (Ill. Cir.
Madison County Ct. Nov. 30, 2000) (awarding large damages award where employer knowingly
exposed plaintiff to asbestos at work and consciously decided against providing safer products to
handle); Coleman v. Touchette Reg'I Hosp., No. 01-CV-314, 2003 WL 23872859 (S.D. Ill. July 15,
2003).
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cumstances that are unique in some way. Comparing damage awards
across cases is difficult, but it provides a new insight.
These calculations are a useful first look at damage predictability.
Comparisons to other jurisdictions, once available, may provide
needed context. This Comment, by necessity, looks at these claims in
a relatively general way, within a relatively small data set. A national
data set may allow one to parse the claims further and compare
groups of nearly identical fact patterns in search of a more refined
analysis. There is an argument to be made about the relative unpre-
dictability of these awards in Madison County and St. Clair County,
but only time-and more data-will tell if the argument is sound.
E. The Judges Are the Problem and Have No Interest in Changing
the System Because They Are Elected with Award Money
ATRA asserts that the tort system in Madison County and St. Clair
County is in disrepair due to corruption and a close-knit relationship
between judges and plaintiffs' attorneys. 50 Of course, ATRA is not
without its own biases, but a claim of preferential treatment in return
for campaign contributions is not far-fetched, nor would it be the first
time a quid pro quo exchange of this type existed in elected govern-
ment.1 51 Fortunately, the judicial alignment of Southern Illinois'
courts makes an empirical test readily available.
To test the veracity of ATRA's claim, we need to compare the ac-
tions of elected judges to a control group dealing with the same peo-
ple or similar circumstances. Theoretically, only the judges of the
Madison and St. Clair state courts should be susceptible to electoral
influence. Federal court judges, meanwhile, provide a good control
subsample. They are appointed to the bench with lifetime tenure and
are not subject to reelection by the local voters.1 52 To test ATRA's
claim of influence, the decisions and awards given by the state courts
need to be compared to the federal decisions from the Southern Dis-
150. See ATRA, JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2004, supra note 10, at 8 ("Question: What makes
jurisdictions 'Judicial Hellholes'? Answer: The judges."); id. at 9 ("Trial lawyer contributions
make up a disproportionate amount of donations to locally-elected judges .... There is a revolv-
ing door among jurists, plaintiffs' lawyers, and government officials."). Of course, ATRA also
claimed that there were 953 asbestos claims filed in Madison County alone in 2003, while the
Verdict Reporter records show only eight that made it to trial in Madison County, St. Clair
County, and the Southern District of Illinois, for the entire thirteen-year sample. Id. at 16.
151. See Anne E. Kornblut, Lobbyist's Role in Hiring Aids Is Investigated, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2,
2005, at Al ("[P]rosecutors investigating Jack Abramoff, the Republican lobbyist, are examining
whether he brokered lucrative jobs for Congressional aides at powerful lobbying firms in ex-
change for legislative favors .... "); see also Carl Hulse, Political Donations, Bribery and the
Portrayal of a Nexus, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2005, at A28.
152. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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trict of Illinois on similar claims to see if there is a discrepancy of
treatment. To be sure, there are reasons why similar claims may turn
out differently in each court. Federal procedural and evidentiary
rules, as well as factual disparities between cases, may lead to different
results. Still, this analysis will provide a reasonable means by which to
determine whether ATRA has a basis for its allegations.
Bearing in mind that the federal courts handle a comparatively
small part of the case load, 153 the results are still telling. With regard
to auto accidents causing injury, the Southern District rendered 20%
of its decisions for the plaintiff.154 Comparatively, the state courts
found for the plaintiff in these cases 22.5% of the time, a statistical tie
considering the relatively Small number of federal observations. 155 In
auto accident wrongful death cases, the Southern District found for
plaintiffs in 67% of the cases, while the state courts only found for
plaintiffs 47% of the time. 5 6
With regard to medical malpractice, the federal courts rendered
plaintiffs' verdicts only 20% of the time. 57 It is worth noting, how-
ever, that the Southern District was responsible for the $19,253,549
verdict in the Coleman case discussed earlier.158 As for the state
courts' treatment of these cases, state judges found for the plaintiffs
31% of the time. 59 But the total value of the entire body of state
court medical malpractice awards in the sample totals only
$19,500,000, nearly the same as the federal court's single decision in
Coleman. This consistency carries over into the area of products lia-
bility. In products liability cases, the Southern District rendered deci-
sions for the plaintiffs in 47% of its cases.160 Similarly, the state courts
found for plaintiffs in 48% of their products liability cases, another
statistical dead heat.' 6 ' The last type of claim to be addressed is the
simple negligence claim. In negligence suits, the Southern District de-
cided in favor of the plaintiffs 38% of the time. 162 Comparatively, the
153. The federal court for the Southern District of Illinois rendered 40 of the 283 decisions in
the Verdict Reporter sample, or a total of 14% of the caseload. Nevertheless, they provide a
needed control group.
154. See Winters, Decision Compilation, supra note 38.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See id.
158. See Coleman v. Touchette Reg'l Hosp., No. 01-CV-314, 2003 WL 23872859 (S.D. I11. July
15, 2003); see also supra notes 140-143 and accompanying text.
159. See Winters, Decision Compilation, supra note 38.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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state courts found in the plaintiffs' favor in 43% of negligence
claims.' 63
Simply put, in none of the different types of claims, including the
hotly debated medical malpractice and products liability areas, did the
state courts perform differently in any significant way from their coun-
terparts on the federal bench. In fact, it was a federal court that ren-
dered the largest medical malpractice award in the sample. 164 The
results indicate that there is little basis for the accusation that the state
court judges of Madison County and St. Clair County are beholden to
the plaintiffs' attorneys. As with many smaller jurisdictions in the
country, the attorneys and judges are likely to know each other, and
many of the judges likely receive campaign contributions from plain-
tiffs' attorneys. But the data here suggest that the judges objectively
preside over the cases before them, rendering decisions in nearly iden-
tical proportion to judges on the federal bench who do not face the
voters and receive no political funding. It is critical to remember that
juries decide most of the tort cases. Nationally, juries decided over
90% of the tort cases that came before both the state and federal
courts. 165 Thus, the final decisions are still largely in the hands of the
best arbiters of our collective conscience.
IV. LOOKING BACK, LOOKING AHEAD
Without regard for the empirical data presented above, which the
vast majority of people have not seen, many have subscribed to the
idea that Congress should pass caps on damage awards as a way of
reining in judges, plaintiffs' attorneys, and the cost of health care. 166
On the surface, this seems like an obvious solution, but it reflects a
simplistic assessment of a challenge that in reality is much more
nuanced. Many scholars and observers feel that the problem of rising
insurance premiums, for instance, does not follow from litigation ex-
penses; rather, it stems from the industry's attempts to achieve stable
returns in the face of reduced investment income. 167 This Part evalu-
ates the validity of such assertions. It then discusses the advantages,
disadvantages, and possible constitutional pitfalls of the proposals by
163. Id.
164. See supra notes 140-143 and accompanying text.
165. Cohen, supra note 37, at 2 tbl.1.
166. See, e.g., Carolyn Victoria J. Lees, The Inevitable Reevaluation of Best v. Taylor in Light
of Illinois' Health Care Crisis, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 217, 218-20 (2005) ("The gist of the problem
is that medical malpractice insurance premiums are skyrocketing primarily in response to ex-
tremely large jury awards for non-economic damages ... .
167. See infra notes 171-178 and accompanying text.
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the President and Congress168 to enact caps on noneconomic dam-
ages.169 Finally, this Part analyzes some alternatives to caps in the
medical malpractice arena, which can improve patient safety, protect
doctors, and help preserve our democracy's balance of power and
equality of protection for all. 170
A. What Has Enron Done with My Doctor?
A fiery political advisor once tacked up a sign in the headquarters
of his political prot6g6 proclaiming, "It's the economy, stupid," in the
hopes of keeping then-Governor Bill Clinton on message during the
1992 Presidential race.171 In the case of tort reform, the sentiment is
no less true. The cyclical nature of the economy and financial markets
continues to be a significant factor in the tort reform debate, though
they would appear unrelated at first blush. Many scholars believe
there is a causal relation between the performance of our national
financial markets and premiums charged by insurance companies,
which have invested as much as 80% of their reserves in the mar-
kets.172 A review of the relevant data will allow the reader to come to
his or her own conclusion.
The Enron question posed above seems preposterous, but it gives
rise to an interesting discussion: How much of an effect do the finan-
cial markets really have on insurance premiums? The data sample
that will be used here to analyze this question was originally compiled
by A.M. Best & Co.,1 7 3 a leader in insurance industry data, news, and
company ratings. The sample captures the total dollar amount of pre-
miums written in Illinois between 1976 and 2000, as well as the
amount paid out to satisfy claims and the amount paid out per practic-
ing doctor in Illinois, adjusted for inflation.1 74 Startling discoveries
can be made about the relationship between insurance and the econ-
168. Patients First Act of 2003, S. 11, 108th Cong. (1st Sess. 2003). For a more comprehensive
description of recent legislative movements in the area of damage caps, see Kathryn Zeiler,
Turning from Damage Caps to Information Disclosure: An Alternative to Tort Reform, 5 YALE J.
HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 385 (2005); Brandon Van Grack, Recent Development, The Medi-
cal Malpractice Liability Limitation Bill, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGiS. 299 (2005).
169. See infra notes 180-207 and accompanying text.
170. See infra notes 208-231 and accompanying text.
171. Edwin J. Feulner, "It's the Economy, Stupid," Circa 1996 (May 16, 1996). The operative
quoted was the famous Democratic political advisor James Carville of Louisiana.
172. Mitchell J. Nathanson, It's the Economy (and Combined Ratio), Stupid: Examining the
Medical Malpractice Litigation Crisis Myth and the Factors Critical to Reform, 108 PENN ST. L.
REV. 1077, 1082-83 (2004).
173. A.M. Best-The Insurance Information Source, http://www.ambest.com (last visited June
17, 2007).
174. A copy of the data set is on file with the DePaul Law Review. However, the data set has
also been made available online by the group Americans for Insurance Reform, see A-m. FOR
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omy simply by looking at the correlation between the movement of
bond interest rates, 75 which make up a considerable percentage of
insurance company investments, and the premiums the companies in
turn charge their customers.
For example, the data indicate that the insurance premiums charged
to doctors in Illinois between 1976 and 2000 shared a negative correla-
tion of 72% with the interest yields from the five-year treasury
bonds.' 76 When interest rates on these bonds are falling, and the in-
come derived from that interest is also falling, the insurance compa-
nies in Illinois tend to increase their premiums. The relationship
between the ten-year treasury bonds and insurance premiums plays
out similarly, enjoying a negative 73% correlation.1 77 Again, in al-
most all cases where the income on these investments was falling due
to falling interest rates, the insurance companies were increasing their
premiums on Illinois doctors at the same time.1 78
INS. REFORM, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: STABLE LOSSES/UNSTABLE RATES IN ILLI-
NOIS (2003), available at http://www.insurance-reform.org/StableLossesIL.pdf.
175. The bond rates referred to in the text are the ten-year U.S. treasury bond, the five-year
U.S. treasury bond, and Moody's "Aaa" rated corporate bonds. U.S. Treasury bonds are highly
secure loans to the government. For a more complete discussion of U.S. Treasury securities,
including those discussed here, see U.S. Treasury, Individual-Treasury Notes, http://www.
treasurydirect.gov/indiv/products/prod-tnotes-glance.htm (last visited June 10, 2007). They pro-
vide virtually no default risk (since they are secured by the U.S. government) and are thus a very
safe, low-yield investment. See id. (suggesting that U.S. Treasury securities may be used to fi-
nance one's education or retirement). The famed corporate rating system utilized by Moody's
assigns a particular rating, Aaa to C (highest to lowest), based on "the possibility that a financial
obligation will not be honored as promised." For a full discussion of Moody's rating system, see
Moody's in Asia-Rating System, http://www.moodysasia.com/mdcsPage.aspx?template=rating
definitions&mdcsld=9 (last visited June 10, 2007). Such ratings reflect both "the likelihood of
default and any financial loss suffered in the event of default." Id. Moody's Aaa rated corporate
bonds are the highest rated and "are judged to be of the highest quality, with minimal credit
risk." Id.
176. Adam G. Winters, Financial Data and Insurance Premium Compilation (Oct. 6, 2005)
[hereinafter Winters, T-Bond and Premium Compilation] (data compilation of treasury and cor-
porate bond data, as well as Illinois insurance premium data from both the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis "Fred®" database and the A.M. Best insurance study, on file with the DePaul
Law Review). Additionally, each of the data series were individually retrieved from the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, which maintains over 3000 series of economic and fiscal data in their
Fred® database. For the corporate bond data, see Moody's Seasoned Aaa Corporate Bond
Yield, http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/data/AAA.txt (last visited June 10, 2007). For the trea-
sury bond data sets, see St. Louis Fed: Economic Data-FRED®, supra note 36.
177. Winters, T-Bond and Premium Compilation, supra note 176.
178. Correlation does not empirically show causation, nor does it capture what the true mo-
tives were for the premium increases. It is also important to note that this is not a regression
analysis. As such, these results do not tell us that the changes in premiums are caused, three-
quarters of the time, by changes in the respective T-Bond rates. It only tells us that in most cases
the rates and premiums move opposite one another. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying
text.
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This is not to say, however, that claims paid by insurance companies
have nothing to do with the changes in premiums. In fact, the data
indicate that, between 1976 and 2000, the premiums charged by Illi-
nois insurers and the losses paid out by those insurers shared a posi-
tive 93% correlation. 179 This means that when insurance companies
were made to pay out more in claims, they almost always raised their
premiums correspondingly. Thus, claims or "losses" provide a partial
explanation for many of the fluctuations in premiums, but they do not
tell the whole story, as indicated by the relationship between premi-
ums and the cycle of interest rates. These results suggest that premi-
ums are not solely a function of losses paid out on claims but are
derived as part of a more nuanced process involving claims, invest-
ment income, and the prospects for future interest rate fluctuations.
B. Would Proposed Damage Caps Be Effective or
Even Constitutional if Implemented?
In the rush to correct the perceived tort crisis, proponents of mea-
sures such as damage caps often fail to evaluate whether such mea-
sures, though politically expedient, would be effective, fair, or even
constitutional. Scholars, observers, and practitioners have all dedi-
cated significant amounts of time and effort to this subject. 180 It is
relevant here because damage caps and other similar measures are
often the proposed solution to concerns about noneconomic damages,
medical malpractice, judicial fairness, and so on. However intuitive
damage caps may seem, they suffer from a lack of effectiveness in
achieving regularity in damage awards, and their constitutionality and
fairness are shaky at best. The following discussion centers around
medical malpractice damage caps, though the analysis can be extrapo-
lated to tort cases generally.
1. Effectiveness
Much of the empirical evidence on tort damage caps indicates that
they often struggle to rein in jury awards and do little in the way of
controlling insurance premiums. For example, California, Colorado,
and Montana, which all have $250,000 caps on noneconomic damages,
have seen their median payment for noneconomic damages increase
179. See Winters, T-Bond and Premium Compilation, supra note 176.
180. See, e.g., Finley, supra note 70; Nathanson, supra note 172; E. Farish Percy, Checking up
on the Medical Malpractice Liability Insurance Crisis in Mississippi: Are Additional Tort Reforms
the Cure?, 73 Miss. L.J. 1001 (2004); Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended Consequences of Medi-
cal Malpractice Damages Caps, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391 (2005); Gfell, supra note 27; Van Grack,
supra note 168.
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53%, 31%, and 169%, respectively, between 1997 and 2003.181 In fact,
some research indicates that such well-publicized or long-standing
caps may distort the jury process and artificially increase awards for
otherwise minor injuries. 182
The other major argument in favor of damage caps is that they give
insurers, especially medical malpractice insurers, the loss protection
necessary to hold premiums level, if not decrease them. But Professor
Marc Galanter recognized that the evidence does not "support the
perceived deleterious effects of the present civil litigation system"; the
only effect is reduced payments to those injured and increased profits
for their insurers. 83 Vidmar has noticed that many of the arguments
in favor of damage caps "have no empirical basis and were based on
unsubstantiated perceptions or unreliable data."' 84 As an example,
Vidmar cited a case study from Indiana, where damage caps were put
into effect in 1975, finding that the number of claims filed per year
had actually increased since the inception of the caps. 185 Vidmar went
on to assert "that he [was] aware of no reliable evidence in the formal
studies which indicate that a limit on noneconomic damages corre-
sponds to a significant impact on the cost or availability of health care
or that noneconomic damages and the costs of liability insurance are
directly linked."'1 86 Consistent with Galanter's and Vidmar's asser-
tions, Farmers Insurance Group decided to stop writing policies in
several states in late 2003, most of those being states that had long-
standing caps on damages: Hawaii, Idaho, Missouri, and even
California. 187
Other empirical evidence also seems to support the claim that dam-
age caps are little more than cosmetic remedies. For example, in a
hearing before the House Subcommittee on Health, it was revealed
that the five states with the highest medical malpractice insurance pre-
miums-Florida, Michigan, Nevada, Ohio, and West Virginia-are all
181. Percy, supra note 180, at 1080-81 & tbl.11.
182. Sharkey, supra note 180, at 423-26 (citing a behavioral study conducted by Michael Saks,
which indicated that having an established cap influenced jurors to use that amount as an
"anchor" or starting point in awarding damages, resulting in an "upward effect on awards" that
should otherwise have been well below the $250,000 cap limit).
183. Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1068 (111. 1997) (relying on Galanter's
statement).
184. Id. (relying on Vidmar's statement).
185. See Eleanor D. Kinney et al., Indiana's Medical Malpractice Act: Results of a Three-Year
Study, 24 IND. L. REV. 1275, 1286 (1991).
186. Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1068.
187. Jordyn K. McAfee, Medical Malpractice Crisis Factional or Fictional?: An Overview of
the GAO Report as Interpreted by the Proponents and Opponents of Tort Reform, 9 J. MED. & L.
161, 172-73 (2005).
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states that have implemented damage caps. 88 In contrast, the state
with the lowest premiums in the nation, Oklahoma, does not have any
cap on damages.189 Furthermore, "between 1991 and 2002 the median
annual medical malpractice insurance premiums rose 35.9% in states
that did not cap damages, compared to a 48.2% increase in states
where damages are capped."' 190 In fact, only eight states saw medical
malpractice premiums hold steady or decline over that time period; 191
six of them do not have damage caps. 192 On the whole, "[i]nsurers in
states with caps raised their premiums at a significantly faster pace
than those in states without caps" and are more likely to have "premi-
ums exceeding the national median than those in states without
caps."'1 93 Thus, the empirical analysis indicates that damage caps do
little to affect the movement of insurance premiums.
2. Constitutionality
The other question is whether the imposition of damage caps would
pass constitutional muster. 94 The first claim often made is that dam-
age caps violate a party's right to a trial by jury under the Seventh
Amendment. 95 The idea is that the damages are an issue of fact for
the jury; caps violate an individual's right to a trial by jury by effec-
188. Assessing the Need to Enact Medical Liability Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Health of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 132 (2003) (statement of Diane
DeGette).
189. Id.
190. Carrie Lynn Vine, The Future of Tort Reform in Illinois: Resisting the Damage Cap
Draw, 17 DCBA BRIEF ONLINE (2004), available at http://www.dcba.org/brief/decissue/2004/
northern1204.htm.
191. Id. at 25.
192. Id.
193. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Martin D. Weiss et al., Medical Malprac-
tice Caps: The Impact of Non-economic Damage Caps on Physician Premiums, Claims Payout
Levels, and Availability of Coverage 8 (2003), http://www.weissratings.com/MedicalMalpractice.
pdf). The caps are relatively ineffective in curbing premium increases. In 2003, Florida Gover-
nor Jeb Bush pushed a medical malpractice bill through the Florida legislature, promising that
the damage caps imposed by the "bill would 'reduce ever-increasing insurance premiums for
Florida's physicians,"' Julie Kay, Surprise Hikes Despite Legislation That Promised to Rein in
Physicians' Insurance Premiums, Three Firms File for Big Rate Increases, MIAMI DAILY Bus.
REV., Nov. 20, 2003. The accounting firm of Deloitte and Touche was hired to project the results
of these caps, which they concluded would be a precipitous drop in insurance premiums of
nearly 8%. Id. This was not what happened, however. In November of 2003, just three months
after the passage of the bill, three insurance carriers requested permission from the Florida Of-
fice of Insurance Regulation to raise their rates yet again. Id.
194. See, e.g., Gfell, supra note 27, at 783-99.
195. U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved .... ").
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tively taking the determination out of the jury's hands.' 96 State courts
that have invalidated damage caps on these grounds have generally
looked at the scope of the jury's function at the time of its state consti-
tution's passage; they found that the determination of damages was
within that scope at the time of passage, therefore making a legislative
attempt to remove that power unconstitutional. 197
The other major constitutional argument offered against damage
caps is that they violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and similar provisions of state constitutions. 98 The as-
sertions made under these provisions are generally based on one of
two grounds:
(1) differential treatment of plaintiffs in medical malpractice cases
versus plaintiffs in other personal injury cases (who can obtain full
recovery), and (2) plaintiffs severely injured through medical mal-
practice who have large non-economic damages versus those with
small or non-existent non-economic damages from medical mal-
practice (who can obtain full recovery). 199
The outcome of a court's analysis of a particular situation will be the
result of a multifaceted approach, weighing "the nature of the rights
involved,... the interest of the state in promulgating the legislation[,]
[and] the relation between the differential treatment and the goal
meant to be obtained. '200
Some have argued that these caps discriminate against women and
children, who generally have fewer recoverable "economic" damages
such as wages, but must be awarded noneconomic damages to be fully
compensated.2 01 Economic damages awarded to compensate for wage
loss provide the most benefit to higher wage earners. Women (who
on average earn less than men) and children (who often have no such
damages at all) will receive less for similar injuries. 20 2 Moreover, in
projecting economic damages based on future wage losses, attorneys
and judges often use wage data that has built-in gender and racial bi-
196. See Gfell, supra note 27, at 784; Kevin S. Mahoney, Note, Alaska's Cap on Noneconomic
Damages: Unfair, Unwise, and Unconstitutional, 11 ALASKA L. REV. 67, 81-84 (1994); Michael
P. Murphy, Note, Tort Reform: Would a Noneconomic Damages Cap Be Constitutional, and Is
One Necessary in Iowa?, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 813, 817-19 (2005).
197. Gfell, supra note 27, at 784 (citing Lakin v. Senco Prods., Inc., 987 P.2d 463, 468-75 (Or.
1999)).
198. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No state shall make or enforce any law which shall...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."); see also ILL. CONST.
art. I, § 2 ("No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law
nor be denied the equal protection of the laws.").
199. Gfell, supra note 27, at 790.
200. Id. at 791.
201. Finley, supra note 70, at 1280-82.
202. Id. at 1281.
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ases, essentially assuming that current "wage disparities will remain
ensconced in the future." 20 3 This makes noneconomic damages rela-
tively more important to women, children, and minorities. Thus, a cap
that limits recovery for only noneconomic injuries may have a dispro-
portionate impact on these groups, giving rise to constitutional
challenges. 204
Further, some medical malpractice injuries are suffered dispropor-
tionately by women, including difficulties involved in pregnancy or
child birth.20 5 Those injuries affect women in primarily noneconomic
terms, such as "emotional distress and grief... impaired relationships,
or impaired physical capacities, such as reproduction, that are not di-
rectly involved in market based wage earning activity. ' '2°6 Such con-
siderations are deemed "worthless" in the market.20 7 As a result,
these injuries can only be compensated by -noneconomic damages,
which will be capped, indexed, and limited under most plans. If not
equal protection, then simple fairness demands that measures are not
taken which could create such unfortunate byproducts.
3. Alternative Measures
While many agree on. the need to improve patient safety, stabilize
insurance premiums, and protect -physicians, damage caps rest on
shaky practical and constitutional grounds, so it is appropriate to dis-
cuss some alternatives that can accomplish these goals. The first set of
alternatives deals with the parties to a suit and the litigation affect on
insurance premiums. It has been suggested that we adopt a practice
similar to that employed in Great Britain, where the loser in a lawsuit
pays the attorney's fees 'of the prevailing party.20 8 The costs of litiga-
tion, especially in the area of medical malpractice, can be incredibly
high. The idea is that forcing a losing plaintiff (or their attorneys) to
pay the opposition's legal, fees would compel plaintiffs' attorneys to
reject cases that appear meritless. 20 9 Of course, transferring addi-
tional risks of litigation onto attorneysimay lead them to be cautious
in selecting cases; some meritorious claims could go unheard and with-
out remedy.
203. Id. at 1280.
204. Id. at 1280-82.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1281.
207. Finley, supra note 70, at 1281.
208. See, e.g., Gfell, supra note 27, at 806-07.
209. Id. at 806.
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A second proposal involves the creation of award "schedules,"
which are legislatively created ranges of appropriate awards for differ-
ent types of injury.210 Like damage caps, these ranges would allow
parties to a lawsuit to more effectively calculate the risks of litiga-
tion.211 It is alleged that such schedules would allow insurance compa-
nies to account for risk by defining what their exposure to liability
may be when insuring a particular doctor in a particular practice. 212
Moreover, when combined with insurance data on the incidence of
malpractice in certain specialties or practice areas, firms would be bet-
ter able to assess their risks, invest accordingly, and maintain more
stable premium levels.213 The counterargument here flows from the
variability of awards given in Madison County and St. Clair County.214
Rigid boundaries, however intuitively appealing, may not fully ac-
count for the wide variability of fact patterns within even relatively
specific types of claims, or the unique characteristics of individuals
who are injured. For example, a schedule that limited damages for
head trauma due to negligent operation of a motor vehicle to between
$250,000 and $500,000 may be sufficient if the person sustaining injury
is elderly or even an adult. If the injured person is a child who will
require medical care for the next fifty or sixty years, this sum may be
grossly inadequate. Such schedules, if established, would need the
built-in flexibility to adapt to changing fact patterns in similar cases.
Also, to the extent that these boundaries prevent awards that judges
or juries truly feel are justified, the schedules invade provinces tradi-
tionally reserved to them.
Other alternatives focus reform not on the courts or even the doc-
tors, but rather on the companies ultimately charging the premiums
and writing the policies. It has been suggested that rather than tort
reform, we need insurance reform.215 Companies will not willingly
give up profits that it appears the market will bear; it is up to external
regulation of the kind we see in the utilities markets to ensure the
access to and affordability of insurance coverage. In offering this sug-
gestion, some rely on the words of the Supreme Court in German Alli-
ance Insurance Co. v. Lewis.216 In Lewis, Justice Joseph McKenna,
relying on several lower court and state supreme court decisions,
210. Id. at 808.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. See supra notes 132-149 and accompanying text.
215. See McAfee, supra note 187, at 183-84; Vine, supra note 190.
216. McAfee, supra note 187, at 183 (citing German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389
(1914)).
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stated that it is "the conception of the lawmaking bodies of the coun-
try without exception that the business of insurance so far affects the
public welfare as to invoke and require governmental regulation. '217
This is so, the Court continued, because so much of the country's
wealth is protected by the insurance mechanism, making it clearly of a
public interest. 218
Insurance reformers instruct us to look no further than California, a
state hailed by those who favor damage caps for its aggressive tort
reform measures and its passage of the Medical Injury Compensation
Reform Act (MICRA) in 1976.219 The legislation placed a hard cap of
$250,000 on noneconomic damages. 220 Insurance reformers would
point out, however, that the caps did little to slow down premiums,
which actually increased by 16% in some instances and as much as
337% in others. 221 After several years of this trend, voters in Califor-
nia cast their ballots to approve Proposition 103,222 which required (1)
"every insurer [to] reduce its charges to levels which are at least 20%
less than the charges for the same coverage which were in effect on
November 8, 1987";223 (2) a temporary freeze of rate increases;224 and
(3) that all future premium increases needed prior approval by the
state's Department of Insurance. 225 In response to the passage of Pro-
position 103, insurance premiums in California immediately fell by
over 20% (due to the requirement in the statute) and have since risen
only in proportion to inflation.226 The disadvantage of this approach
is that it puts the government in charge of deciding reasonable premi-
ums and profit levels for an industry where investments are derived in
the free market and risks are not capped. Also, as we saw above,
premiums seem to move in relation to losses paid.227 A simple cap on
217. German Alliance Ins. Co., 233 U.S. at 412.
218. Id. at 413.
219. Vine, supra note 190 (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE:
SIX STATE CASE STUDIES SHOW CLAIMS AND INSURANCE COSTS STILL RISE DESPITE REFORMS
25 (1986) [hereinafter GAO, SIX STATE CASE STUDIES]).
220. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2(b) (McKinney 1997).
221. GAO, SIX STATE CASE STUDIES, supra note 219, at 26.
222. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.01 (McKinney 2005).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Vine, supra note 190 (citing The Medical Liability Insurance Crisis: A Review of the Situa-
tion in Pennsylvania: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 130 (2003) (testimony of Harvey Rosenfield,
President, Foundation for Consumer and Taxpayer Rights)).
227. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
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premiums may not be a complete solution, though it seems to have
been effective in California thus far. 228
The last alternative would provide increased protections for doc-
tors, hospitals, and researchers to study and seek corrections for past
medical errors to improve patient safety. But it would also shield the
doctors and institutions involved from having the information used
against them in litigation. Specifically, it has been suggested that the
State of Illinois establish a systemic errors reporting system under the
authority of the Illinois Medical Studies Act.229 This could provide a
safe harbor in which errors could be analyzed openly with the ultimate
goal of greater patient safety and physician competency.230 The
thought is that "absent the statutory peer-review privilege, physicians
would be reluctant to sit on peer-review committees and engage in
frank evaluations of their colleagues. '231 Only if we provide the medi-
cal community the requisite space and protection can patient safety be
addressed directly, as opposed to the indirect means of assessing pen-
alties through litigation.
This Comment proposes a blended approach. It is apparent from
the data that damage caps alone would do little to rein in awards or
premiums, and would have the deleterious effect of falling dispropor-
tionately on women, children, and the elderly. 232 The data from Cali-
fornia, however, suggest that a form of insurance regulation would
have the desired effect of slowing down the massive premium in-
creases we have experienced in the last several years without a corre-
228. A provision similar to California's Proposition 103 was passed recently in Illinois, but
with some potentially significant differences. See 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/155.18 (West
2000 & Supp. 2007) (insurance regulation); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1706.5 (West 2005)
(setting the damage cap for noneconomic damages at $500,000). The statute further specifies
that "[t]he burden is on the company to justify the rate or proposed rate at the public hearing."
215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/155.18. The damage cap portion of the new statute limits
noneconomic damages to $500,000. Id. § 5/2-1706.5. The most noteworthy difference from the
California statutes is that the Illinois statute is "non-severable." This means that, unlike in Cali-
fornia, if either the damage cap provision or the insurance regulatory provision were deemed
unconstitutional, then both provisions would be invalidated. Id. This could be significant as the
Illinois Supreme Court has recently invalidated a similar damage cap on constitutional grounds.
See Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (Ill. 1997) (holding unconstitutional Public Act
89-7, which limited the recovery of noneconomic damages to $500,000). It is unclear what sort of
effect this has or will have on awards and insurance rates in Illinois, but if California is any
indication, this could provide a good first step in the effort to rein in insurance premiums.
229. Stephan Landsman, Establishment of a Systemic Errors Reporting System to Improve
Medical Care 3-4 (Inst. of Med. of Chi., Working Group on Patient Safety, Sept. 13, 2004) (un-
published White Paper, on file with Professor Landsman, DePaul University College of Law).
230. Id.
231. Id. at 3 (citing Roach v. Springfield Clinic, 623 N.E.2d 246, 251 (Il1. 1993)).
232. See supra notes 181-193, 201-207 and accompanying text.
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sponding negative effect on the accessibility of health care.233 The
other serious concerns are both the future protection of the individu-
als injured and the doctors we look to for help in emergencies. Thus,
this Comment proposes the passage of comprehensive insurance rate
regulation, as Illinois has recently done.2 34 But the regulation should
recognize that insurance companies operate in free markets and bear
risks which are not indexed and capped. It should also include an
expansive "safe harbor" provision so that doctors, researchers, and
hospitals could conduct an open self-evaluation and improve patient
safety without the concomitant fear that the information will be used
against them in litigation.
V. CONCLUSION
You cannot believe everything that you hear. Many groups and in-
dividuals, from ATRA to President Bush, have criticized our justice
system, telling us it is broken, unfair, and costly to innocent Ameri-
cans. Others have told us that the judges in Madison County and St.
Clair County are to blame, even accusing them of being in the pockets
of trial lawyers. The data indicate that there is some truth to the as-
sertion that the system is imperfect. But the data also tell us that,
while the systems in Madison County and St. Clair County may not be
perfect, they are no different from other jurisdictions. Plaintiffs here
do not perform appreciably better than plaintiffs nationally, and state
courts decide cases nearly identically to their federal counterparts.
There is still much work to be done in this area; this was only one
sample and only a starting point. Future research, including a larger
database of Illinois decisions and a fuller national sample, could allow
the comparison of awards between cases with much closer fact pat-
terns than was available here. The use of regression analysis could
move beyond inferences drawn from correlations to being able to sta-
tistically show the influence of investment income and claims paid on
insurance premiums. A closer look into the effectiveness and consti-
tutionality of damage caps is certainly warranted, as is an evaluation
of each of the alternatives offered alongside of them. Any and all of
this work could be incredibly valuable.
Though one may criticize the relative variance of awards, much of
that can be explained by the divergence of factual situations that con-
front judges and juries on a daily basis. Some contend that caps will
be the answer. It is perfectly intuitive to see a problem in rising insur-
233. See supra notes 215-228 and accompanying text.
234. See supra note 228.
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ance premiums, believe what is said about the tort system's responsi-
bility for it, and conclude that capping the latter will stop the former.
But before declaring "mission accomplished" in solving this problem,
consider the following. The latest ATRA study lists its top "hellhole"
for 2005 as the jurisdiction of Rio Grande Valley in President Bush's
home state of Texas, a leader in the enactment of damage caps; and
moved to the top of ATRA's "watch list" was California, the first state
to enact sweeping damage cap legislation. 235 Going forward, it ap-
pears that caps will not be the answer, and no one is quite sure what
will be. As discussed above, some feel that different payment struc-
tures, a medical malpractice reporting system, or even regulation of
the insurance industry will be the panacea. To be sure, each proposed
solution has its drawbacks, but it does show that there is more than
one alternative to consider. It may even take several of the measures
to achieve the results and justice we seek.
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